Alliance Capacity Sharing and Market Congestion in Container Shipping
This paper studies how alliance capacity sharing shapes long-term contracting, vessel availability, and carrier surplus in container shipping. Carriers lease vessels subject to uncertain demand, while alliance members can subsequently share capacity, improving capacity utilization. This encourages greater use of long-term contracts, which reduces vessel availability and creates congestion externalities for independent carriers. We develop and estimate a dynamic model of capacity contracting under demand uncertainty and search frictions using data on lease contracts and capacity utilization. The model captures the feedback between contracting and vessel availability, allowing us to quantify equilibrium spillovers. Counterfactual analysis shows that capacity sharing generates substantial utilization gains for alliance carriers but reduces independent carrier surplus by 1.73%. On net, these gains outweigh the losses, increasing aggregate surplus by 3.24%. The results reveal a channel through which an efficiency-enhancing alliance arrangement can create adverse spillovers for independent carriers by tightening access to capacity in a frictional input market.